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ABSTRACT
Whilst the predecessor (Part I) to this paper addresses criticisms and challenges which have arisen 
in  response  to  recent  Basel  Committee's  initiatives  aimed  at  addressing  capital  and  liquidity 
standards,  the present paper highlights further measures which are being introduced by the Basel 
Committee to address such criticisms and challenges.
As well as presenting and drawing attention to proposals which could serve as means of addressing 
challenges presented by liquidity risks, Part I of the paper concludes with the result that market 
based regulation is an essential and vital tool in the Basel Committee's efforts to address some of 
the challenges presented by liquidity risks.  The present paper highlights the Basel  Committee's 
acknowledgement  of  this  conclusion.  Furthermore,  it  draws  attention  to  other  areas  which  are 
considered to constitute fertile substrates for purposes of future research.
This paper will also illustrate why the potential of banking regulations and disclosure requirements 
to impact risk taking levels is not only dependent on certain factors such as the dissemination of 
information  to  appropriate  recipients,  appropriate  volume of  disseminated  information,  when to 
disseminate such information, but also on other factors such as ownership structures and effective 
corporate governance measures aimed fostering monitoring, supervision and accountability.
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Introduction
The severity and magnitude of the recent Financial Crisis is attributed to sequential factors and 
events which generated aggregational effects and such amplitude that were to contribute to the most 
devastating global Financial Crisis till date. These series of events (which generated devastating 
consequences), it is stated,2 are attributed to the build up of excessive on- and off-balance sheet 
leverage in the banking sectors of many countries, which was followed by the depletion of capital 
levels  and quality –  whose occurrence was gradual.  It  is  further  argued that  many banks were 
simultaneously retaining inadequate levels of liquidity buffers.3 
A procyclical deleveraging process and the interconnectedness of systemic institutions through an 
array of complex transactions, are also considered to be responsible for the resulting magnitude of 
the Crisis. 4
Just as systemic risks and information asymmetries are issues which constitute the embodiment of 
the rationale for financial regulation, they are also opposite sides of the same coin whose common 
features can be derived as a result of their link with liquidity risks. If information asymmetries 
could be mitigated, to the extent that information were to be complete, accurate and timely – with 
particular emphasis  on timely information,  could liquidity risks be controlled to such an extent 
whereby it would also be possible to manage systemic risks?
As  discussed in  Part  One to  this  paper,  transparency and disclosure  also have  the  potential  to 
generate moral hazard. By correctly discerning who to disseminate information to (the appropriate 
recipients  of  such  information),  the  appropriate  volume  of  information,  as  well  as  when  to 
disseminate  such  information,  moral  hazard,  as  well  as  liquidity  and  systemic  risks  could  be 
managed.
As well as the introduction of measures aimed at consolidating the regulatory capital framework – 
such consolidation focussing on the three pillars of Basel II, the Basel Committee also introduced 
macroprudential elements into the capital framework to help contain systemic risks arising from 
procyclicality and the interconnectedness of financial institutions.5 
Having considered how market based regulation could help address liquidity risks (Part One to this 
paper), Part Two will commence with a section which considers other factors which should be taken 
into account in mitigating liquidity and systemic risks. Section two will then consider recent Basel 
1 School of Social Sciences and Law, Oxford Brookes University, Headington Campus, Oxford, OX3 0BP. 
marianneojo@brookes.ac.uk and marianneojo@hotmail.com
2 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, „Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework For More Resilient Banks 
and Banking Systems“ at page 9 of 77 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf
3 Such series of events were considered to be responsible for  the inability of the banking system to absorb „the 
resulting systemic trading and credit losses „ as well as its inability to cope with „the reintermediation of large off-
balance sheet exposures that had built up in the shadow banking system“; ibid  http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf
4 Ibid 
5 Ibid at page 10 of 77
Committee initiatives aimed at improving consistency, transparency and comparability, as well as 
efforts aimed at enhancing risk coverage. The third section will then highlight efforts undertaken 
(and being undertaken) by the Basel Committee to manage systemic risks. This will be followed by 
a  section  which  draws  attention  to  some  areas  which  constitute  areas  of  focus  in  the  Basel 
Committee's efforts to address liquidity risks - before a conclusion is derived in section five. 
I. Corporate Governance and Ownership Structures
The potential of banking regulations and disclosure requirements to impact risk taking levels is not 
only  dependent  on  the  factors  already mentioned  (dissemination  of  information  to  appropriate 
recipients, appropriate volume of disseminated information, when to disseminate such information), 
but also on some other factors such as ownership structures and effective corporate governance 
measures aimed fostering monitoring, supervision and accountability.
A. Accountability, Joint Responsibility and Proportionate Liability
Where a decision is reached by a group of individuals – in contrast to an individual decision, should
this infer a greater scope for accountability or fairness (in the sense that more people will be held 
accountable for the decision) and less scope for injustice (in arriving at that decision)? Baldwin 
argues that even if responsibility for mediation is clearly and uncontentionally allocated, serious 
issues  of  democratic  legitimacy  and  accountability  may  still  arise.6 His  concept  of  “thick 
proceduralisation”, that is, “processes in which mediators can play an enabling role by translating 
the messages and logics of various systems or groups so that others can understand and so that 
communication can be facilitated across different systems and groups” was advanced in the hope 
that parties with differing views could effectively engage in the deliberation process.7 
As discussed in an earlier paper,8 the likelihood of a qualified audit opinion (as regards the auditor’s 
findings on the financial statements) is considered to be less effective as a deterrent to risk taking by 
management – particularly where an individual manager or few managers are held responsible for 
fraudulent related acts. Apportionment of liability on a proportionate basis would produce a more 
equitable result – than in such case where a qualified opinion is issued by the auditor ( where an 
individual manager or few managers are held responsible for fraudulent related acts).
The existence of a lead mediator or translator would resolve the problems attributed to lack of 
accountability to a large extent – given that such a person would assume joint responsibility and 
liability (even though at a greater proportion than that attributable to other members of the group) 
for  consequences  arising  as  a  result  of  the  group’s  decisions.  Given  that  such  increased 
responsibility is accepted and given that other group members also assume and accept some form of 
contributory responsibility for possible consequential liabilities(which accords with proportionate 
increases in the level of fines imposed on each member), members within the group would also 
strive  towards  ensuring  that  decisions  are  taken  with  utmost  level  of  due  diligence  and  that 
members work on a more cooperative basis – rather than a culture of “passing on the buck” to the 
lead mediator/communicator. Where such conditions exist and operate, “clear and uncontentiously
allocated” responsibilities should facilitate accountability and legitimacy.9
6 R Baldwin, “The New Punitive Regulation” May 2004 Volume 67 No 3 Modern law Review at page 380
7 ibid
8 See M Ojo, „The Role of the External Auditor in Corporate Governance: Agency Problems and the Management of 
Risk at page 5 http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15989/1/MPRA_paper_15989.pdf and 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1427899
9 For further information on this, see M Ojo, „Building on the Trust of Management: Overcoming the Paradoxes of 
Principles Based Regulation pages 8 -10 and particularly page 10 http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/22500/1/MPRA_paper_22500.pdf and http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1600504
B. Impact of Ownership Structures, Bank Regulations and Disclosure Requirements on Risk Taking
In considering the impact of bank regulations and disclosure requirements on risk taking, reference 
will be made to Laeven and Levine's conclusion that whilst the application of bank regulations 
could lead to lower levels of risk taking, they could also induce higher levels of risk taking.10 Lower 
levels of risk taking may occur where owners are compelled to invest more of their personal wealth 
in the bank and the converse may occur where capital requirements do not compel owners to invest 
more of their wealth in the bank – although they might encourage greater levels of capital to be 
generated.11 However Laeven and Levine add that since the relationship between risk and regulation 
is  critically  dependent  on  individual  banks’  ownership  structures,  with  the  effect  that  the 
relationship  between  regulation  and  bank  risk  can  vary  according  to  ownership  structure,  a 
consideration of the impact of ownership structures is necessary in order to present a more accurate 
analysis of bank risk taking.12 Further, they illustrate their assertion through a demonstration of how 
ownership  structure  associates  with  bank  regulations  to  impact  the  risk  taking  behaviour  of 
individual banks.13 
The theories which were considered in illustrating such an assertion are as follows:14
• That the effect of regulation on risk is dependent on the relative influence of owners who exist 
within governance structures of individual banks
• That bank regulators influence risk taking incentives of owners in a different manner to those of 
managers (banking theory),
•  That ownership structures affect the ability of owners to influence risk (corporate governance 
theory)15
II. Recent Basel Committee Initiatives
i) Aimed at Improving Consistency, Transparency and Comparability.
In response to some of the concerns raised in Part One to this paper – as regards consistency in the 
application  of  the  Basel  Committee's  Capital  and  Liquidity  Standards,  the  Committe  has  been 
engaged in efforts aimed at facilitating the comparability and assessment of the quality of capital 
between  institutions.  In  order  to  achieve  this  aim,  improved  measures  targeted  at  facilitating 
disclosure – as well as a definition for capital (such definition facilitating greater consistency across 
10   L Laeven and R Levine, ‚Bank Governance, Regulations and Risk Taking’ 2008 Journal of Financial Economics at 
page 4
11 See ibid; Also see D Kim and A Santomero, ‚Risk in Banking and Capital Regulation’ 1994 Journal of Finance 43
at 1219-1233
12 L Laeven and R Levine, ‚Bank Governance, Regulations and Risk Taking’ 2008 Journal of Financial Economics at 
page 6
13 ibid at page 5
14 For further information on this refer to M Ojo, The Role of External Auditors in Corporate Governance: Agency 
Problems and the Management of Risk at pages 2 and 3
15 „By merging the theories, they arrive at the conclusion that: Firstly, owners who have “diversified” their assets have 
greater incentives to indulge in higher levels of risk taking than managers who are non shareholders and that as a 
result, banks which have powerful and diversified owners are more likely to be riskier than “widely held banks” – 
provided  other  factors  are  constantly  maintained.  Secondly,  bank  regulations  such  as  capital  requirements  and 
deposit insurance, generate effects which differ when considered in relation to incentives of owners as opposed to 
that of managers and that as a result, the “comparative power of shareholders relative to managers within each 
bank’s corporate governance structure” influences the real impact of regulations on risk taking.“;L Laeven and R 
Levine, ‚Bank Governance, Regulations and Risk Taking’ 2008 Journal of Financial Economics at page 5
jurisdictions), comprise some of the efforts currently being undertaken.16
ii) Aimed at Enhancing Risk Coverage
Failure to capture major on- and off-balance sheet risks, as well as derivative related exposures, it is 
argued, was a key destabilising factor during the crisis.17 
− In response to these shortcomings,  the Committee in  July 2009 completed a  number of 
critical  reforms  to  the  Basel  II  framework  –  such  reforms  aimed  at  increasing  capital 
requirements for the trading book and complex securitisation exposures, a major source of 
losses for many internationally active banks. The enhanced treatment introduces a stressed 
value-at-risk  (VaR)  capital  requirement  based  on  a  continuous  12-month  period  of 
significant  financial  stress.  In  addition,  the  Committee  has  introduced  higher  capital 
requirements for so-called resecuritisations in both the banking and the trading book. The 
reforms also raise the standards of the Pillar 2 supervisory review process and strengthen 
Pillar 3 disclosures.18
Even though the Basel Committee's determination of risk-weights and capital charges, and indeed 
the risk weighting process have been questioned,19 initiatives in other areas (such initiatives aimed 
at  mitigating pro cyclicality and promoting countercyclical  buffers),  as  well  as efforts aimed at 
facilitating macro prudential supervision have received more positive responses.20
III. Efforts Undertaken by the Basel Committee to Contain Systemic Risks
Mitigating Procyclicality and Promoting Countercyclical Buffers 
In collaboration with the Financial Stability Board, the Basel Committee has been developing a 
„well  integrated  approach  to  systemically  important  financial  institutions  which  could  include 
combinations of capital surcharges, contingent capital and bail-in debt“. 21
16 In facilitating a more consistent definition for capital, „the predominant form of Tier 1 capital must be common 
shares and retained earnings. To improve market discipline, the transparency of the capital base is to be improved, 
with all elements of capital required to be disclosed along with a detailed reconciliation to the reported accounts. 
The Committee is introducing these changes in a manner that minimises the disruption to capital instruments that are 
currently outstanding. It will also continue to review the role that contingent capital should play in the regulatory 
capital framework.„  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, „Basel III: A  Global Regulatory Framework For 
More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems“ at pages 10 - 11 of 77 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf
17 See ibid at page 11 of 77
18 ibid
19 See H Scott, „Reducing Systemic Risk Through the Reform of Capital Regulation“Journal of International 
Economic Law 13(3), 763–778 at page 5 of 16
20 Amongst other initiatives undertaken by the Committee, are those which include the assessment of measures aimed 
at:
− Mitigating the the reliance on external ratings of the Basel II framework. The measures include requirements 
for  banks  to  perform  their  own  internal  assessments  of  externally  rated  securitisation  exposures,  the 
elimination of certain “cliff effects” associated with credit risk mitigation practices, and the incorporation of 
key elements of the IOSCO Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies into the Committee’s 
eligibility criteria for the use of external ratings in the capital framework. 
− Supplementing the risk-based capital requirement with a leverage ratio of the underlying features of the crisis 
was the build up of excessive on- and off-balance sheet leverage in the banking system. See Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision, „Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework For More Resilient Banks and Banking 
Systems“ at page 12 of 77
21 Ibid at page 15 of 77
Some measures which will be introduced by the Basel Committee in its aim to make banks „more 
resilient to procyclical dynamics – as well as helping to ensure that the banking sector serves as a 
shock absorber,  instead of  a  transmitter  of risk to  the financial  system and broader  economy“. 
include:22
− Leverage ratios:23 The Committee agreed to introduce a simple, transparent, non-risk based 
leverage ratio that is calibrated to act as a credible supplementary measure to the risk based 
capital requirements. The leverage ratio is intended to achieve the objectives of constraining 
the  build-up  of  leverage  in  the  banking  sector,  helping  avoid  destabilising  deleveraging 
processes which can damage the broader financial system and the economy; and reinforcing 
the risk based requirements with a simple, non-risk based “backstop” measure.
− Measures aimed at addressing procyclicality and raising the resilience of the banking sector 
in good times. Key objectives of these measures being: to dampen any excess cyclicality of 
the  minimum  capital  requirement;  promote  more  forward  looking  provisions;  conserve 
capital to build buffers at individual banks and the banking sector that can be used in stress; 
and  to  achieve  the  broader  macroprudential  goal  of  protecting  the  banking  sector  from 
periods of excess credit growth. 
IV. Identified Areas which Constitute Focus in Relation to Liquidity Risks
Such identified areas include:24
(a) Contractual maturity mismatch: 
− To gain an understanding of the basic aspects of a bank’s liquidity needs,  banks should 
frequently conduct a contractual maturity mismatch assessment.  This metric provides an 
initial, simple baseline of contractual commitments and is useful in comparing liquidity risk 
profiles across institutions, and to highlight to both banks and supervisors when potential 
liquidity needs could arise.
(b) Concentration of funding: 
− This metric involves analysing concentrations of wholesale funding provided by specific 
counterparties, instruments and currencies. A metric covering concentrations of wholesale 
funding assists supervisors in assessing the extent to which funding liquidity risks could 
occur in the event that one or more of the funding sources are withdrawn.
(c) Available unencumbered assets:
This  metric  measures  the  amount  of  unencumbered  assets  a  bank  has  which  could 
potentially be used as  collateral  for  secured funding either  in  the market  or  at  standing 
central  bank  facilities.  This  should  make  banks  (and  supervisors)  more  aware  of  their 
potential  capacity  to  raise  additional  secured  funds,  keeping  in  mind  that  in  a  stressed 
situation this ability may decrease.
22 See ibid at page 13 of 77
23 „One of the underlying features of the crisis was the build-up of excessive on- and off-balance sheet leverage in the 
banking system. In many cases, banks built up excessive leverage while still showing strong risk based capital 
ratios. During the most severe part of the crisis, the banking sector was forced by the market to reduce its leverage in 
a manner that amplified downward pressure on asset prices, further exacerbating the positive feedback loop between 
losses, declines in bank capital, and contraction in credit availability. „ibid at page 68 -69 of 77
24 Ibid at page 18 of 77
−(d) LCR by currency:
In recognition that foreign exchange risk is a component of liquidity risk, the LCR should 
also be assessed in each significant currency, in order to monitor and manage the overall 
level and trend of currency exposure at a bank.
(e) Market-related monitoring tools: 
− In order to have a source of instantaneous data on potential liquidity difficulties, useful data 
to  monitor  includes  market-wide  data  on  asset  prices  and  liquidity,  institution-related 
information such as credit default  swap (CDS) spreads and equity prices, and additional 
institution-specific  information  related  to  the  ability  of  the  institution  to  fund  itself  in 
various wholesale funding markets and the price at which it can do so.
In  relation  to  transitional  arrangements,25 the  Committee  is  introducing  such  arrangements  „to 
implement the new standards that help ensure that the banking sector can meet the higher capital 
standards through reasonable earnings retention and capital raising, while still supporting lending to 
the economy.“26 Both the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio(NSFR) 
are  to  be  subject  to  an  observation  period  and  will  include  a  review  clause  to  address  any 
unintended consequences.27
V. Conclusion
Whilst immense efforts and initiatives have been promulgated by the Basel Committe (in relation to 
systemic and liquidity risks), responses to its introduction of capital standards and its initiatives in 
relation to the control of systemic risks remain more positive than those which relate to liquidity 
standards and metrics. The conclusion derived from the first part to this paper, as well as certain 
observations raised in the present paper, can only lead to an inferral that greater focus on market 
based regulation, greater focus on initiatives and incentives aimed at deterring management from 
taking  undue  and  unneccessary  risks  (including  improved  corporate  governance  measures  and 
practices), constitute some vital factors which should be taken into consideration if liquidity and 
(consequentially) systemic risks are to be effectively controlled and managed.
25 For further information on transitional arrangements and scope of application (page 2/ page 8 of 53), monitoring 
tools relating to contractual maturity mismatch, concentration of funding, available unencumbered assets and market 
related monitoring tools (31-38), and application issues for standards (pages 38 – 40) see  Basel III: International 
Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs188.pdf>
26 „After an observation period beginning in 2011, the LCR will be introduced on 1 January 2015. The NSFR will 
move to a minimum standard by 1 January 2018. The Committee will put in place rigorous reporting processes to 
monitor the ratios during the transition period and will continue to review the implications of these standards for 
financial markets, credit extension and economic growth, addressing unintended consequences as necessary. „
27 „No additional work was done on the impact of stronger liquidity requirements in this report, in view of the fact that 
the liquidity requirements are still subject to an observation period. The Liquidity Coverage Ratio will be introduced 
in 2015 and the Net Stable Funding Ratio in 2018. The estimates for the impact of these measures provided in the 
Interim Report assume a shorter implementation period than that agreed to by the BCBS, and can therefore be 
viewed as conservative estimates. „   See the Final Report of the Macroeconomic Assessment Group (established by 
the Financial Stability Board and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision) „Assessing the Macroeconomic 
Impact  of  the  Transition  to  Stronger  Capital  and  Liquidity  Requirements,  Bank  for  International  Settlement 
Publications December 2010
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